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WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW & THE REMEDIAL WAIVER 
Mary “Kati” Haupt* 
INTRODUCTION 
State workers’ compensation schemes are long-standing systems that facilitate 
efficient markets by identifying the parameters of employer liability for workplace 
injuries and granting certainty in recovery for injured employees. Workers’ 
compensation represents an administrative remedy where no-fault coverage is 
provided for employee work-related injuries, the amount of the remedy being 
determined by the type and severity of the harm.1 These statutory systems represent 
a basic trade-off where, in return for employer strict liability for employee injuries, 
employees waive the right to common-law actions against an employer for 
negligence.2 Placing the transaction costs in the employment context on “the 
employer-injurer, rather than on the employee-victim, is likely to lead to a greater 
recognition of accident costs and to greater incentives toward accident avoidance.”3   
This article discusses these systems by first looking into the history of workers’ 
compensation and the reasons for the laws’ implementation. Second, this article 
discusses current approaches to applying these statutes, and, using Florida as an 
example, explores the harsh remedial results that may follow based on the strict 
statutory schemes. Third, this article considers a way to classify this remedy within 
theoretical models that facilitate an understanding of how states have developed and 
implemented the workers’ compensation systems. Fourth, this article examines the 
policy implications of these systems, particularly within such theoretical framework; 
it looks to how the exclusivity of this remedy and its narrow exception for intentional 
wrongdoing impairs employees’ rights to recovery in particular situations. Finally, 
this article concludes that while statutory workers’ compensation schemes provide 
the appropriate remedy on paper, the harsh results in the laws’ application 
demonstrate that the definition of the intentional tort exception should be revised to 
loosen the restrictive remedial waiver.  
 ________________________  
 *  Mary “Kati” Haupt. J.D., Barry University Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law. 
 1. Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Assessing the Insurance Role of Tort Liability After Calabresi, 77 J. L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 144 (2014). 
 2. Peter D. Webster & Christine Davis Graves, A Primer on the Intentional-Tort Exception to Employers’ 
Workers’ Compensation Immunity, 88 No. 10 FLA. BAR. J. 14, 15 (2014); see also Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 1, 
at 140 (“The distinctive feature of workers’ compensation is that unlike conventional tort liability, it is a no-fault 
compensation system whereby all work injuries are compensated irrespective of worker fault or company 
negligence.”).  
 3. Guido Calabresi, Torts-The Law of the Mixed Society, 56 TEX. L. REV. 519, 520–21 n.6 (1978). 
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I. HISTORY AND APPLICATION OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAWS  
Millions of American employees are involved in work-related injuries every 
year.4 Under traditional common-law principles, employees possessed ineffective 
means to pursue claims against employers that would allow recovery for injury-
related medical expenses or to facilitate income replacement.5 The lack of adequate 
remedies led to the early American workers’ compensation laws.6 These laws were 
implemented due to the unavailability of tort remedies resulting from what is coined 
the “unholy trinity” of common-law tort defenses: contributory negligence, 
assumption of risk, and the fellow servant rule.7 The creation of workers’ 
compensation systems began in Europe in the late 1870s, and the system’s 
implementation in the United States emerged in the beginning of the 1900s.8  
Workers’ compensation is administered by each individual state.9 Currently, all 
fifty states and the District of Columbia have workers’ compensation statutes in 
place.10 The main purpose of these laws is to prescribe a definite remedy for 
employee injuries resulting during the course and scope of employment.11  Workers’ 
compensation systems embody an arrangement between the parties that seemingly 
facilitates each party’s conflicting interests.12 An employer is held strictly liable for 
its employees’ work-related injuries, and employees in turn surrender separate or 
distinct causes of action against the employer: “receipt of certain and expeditious 
payments becomes the sole and exclusive remedy for the injury.”13  
Present-day workers’ compensation statutes require that employers choose to 
directly pay for employee accidents, to contract with private insurance companies to 
maintain such coverage, or to pay premiums to an applicable state’s workers’ 
compensation fund.14 These statutes typically provide that compensation be 
measured by an average weekly wage and the type and length of time of the 
 ________________________  
 4. See GUIDE TO HR POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUALS § 5:4 (2015) (commentary: history of workers’ 
compensation laws). 
 5. Id.  
 6. Id. 
 7. Joseph H. King, Jr., The Exclusiveness of an Employee’s Workers’ Compensation Remedy Against His 
Employer, 55 TENN. L. REV. 405, 409 n.15 (1988); see also Gregory P. Guyton, A Brief History of Workers’ 
Compensation, 19 IOWA ORTHOPAEDIC J. 106, 106 (1999) (discussing that under contributory negligence principles, 
an employee’s recovery was barred by any negligence on his/her own part, the fellow servant rule barred recovery 
if the negligence was at all contributable in portion or entirety to a fellow employee, and assumption of risk principles 
held that employees knew the risk of employment and accepted it by signing his/her employment contract).  
 8. Mark R. Whitmore, Note, Denying Scholarship Athletes Workers’ Compensation: Do Courts Punt Away 
a Statutory Right?, 76 IOWA L. REV. 763, 767 (1991) (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON 
TORTS § 80, at 573 (5th ed. 1984)). 
 9. See Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 1.  
 10. Whitmore, supra note 8, at 767.  
 11. See id. at 768–70 (explaining that “[p]rior to the advent of workers’ compensation, eighty percent of all 
industrial accident claims failed or left the plaintiff uncompensated [and that this] occurred primarily because of 
plaintiffs’ difficulties in overcoming their employers’ formidable tort defenses: contributory negligence, assumption 
of risk, and the fellow servant doctrine”). 
 12. STEPHEN P. PEPE & SCOTT H. DUNHAM, AVOIDING AND DEFENDING WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CLAIMS § 
21:5 (2016).  
 13. Id.  
 14. Whitmore, supra note 8, at 779–80.  
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injuries.15 Benefit levels are associated with different types of work-related injuries 
based on predetermined payment schedules, and these systems address the income 
loss associated with the injury but do not account for pain and suffering or legal 
expenses.16  
Workers’ compensation schemes provide an exclusive remedy for work-related 
injuries,17 with limited exceptions, including an exception if the employer neglects 
to carry workers’ compensation insurance or if the employer commits an intentional 
tort that results in an employee’s injury or death.18 Under this exclusive remedy 
provision, employers waive common-law tort defenses; however, the regime also 
provides that an employee may not sue the employer in tort (i.e., for the employer’s 
negligence), and the employee’s exclusive remedy is to accept the statutory 
compensation for any resultant injury.19  Thus, the compensation is a “‘mechanism 
for providing cash-wage benefits and medical care to victims of work-connected 
injuries, and for placing the cost of these injuries ultimately on the consumer through 
the medium of insurance whose premiums are passed on in the cost of the 
product.’”20     
Today, although each state’s laws are distinct, all of the schemes possess the 
same attributes: the laws create a mandatory statutory program that provides 
employees protection for work-related injuries without regard to the fault of the 
parties.21 The structure of a state’s workers’ compensation scheme usually is as 
follows:  
The typical state act include[s] the following features: (1) 
negligence and fault of the employer and employee [are] immaterial 
to recover, (2) common law suits against the employer [are] barred, 
(3) medical expenses [are] capped at a percentage of the employee’s 
wage, (4) an administrative agency r[uns] the system with relaxed 
 ________________________  
 15. Samuel Estreicher, Judicial Nullification: Guido Calabresi’s Uncommon Common Law for a Statutory 
Age, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1133–34 (1982). 
 16. Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 1, at 140.  
 17. See King, supra note 7, at 416 (“The exclusive remedy rule determines under what circumstances an 
employee’s remedy against his employer, his co-employees, and the workers’ compensation insurer is limited to 
workers’ compensation, and when that employee may proceed against such entities or individuals under other 
theories of liability such as common-law tort.”). 
 18. Joseph A. Page, Selecting the Remedy, 3 AM. JUR. TRIALS § 1, at 637 (2016) (originally published in 
1964). 
 19. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.015 (West 2015) (“The workers’ compensation system in Florida is 
based on a mutual renunciation of common-law rights and defenses by employers and employees alike.”); see also 
Whitmore, supra note 8, at 771–72 (discussing further that these provisions apply to employees and not to 
independent contractors, and that the injury must arise from fulfilling the terms of an employment agreement); 
Estreicher, supra note 15, at 1134 (“The statutes reflected a compromise: the employee was assured a fairly certain 
recovery, but had to forfeit any civil action and the chance, however unlikely, of obtaining more from a jury.”). 
 20. Martha S. Davis, Rape in the Workplace, 41 S.D. L. REV. 411, 414 (1996) (citing ARTHUR LARSON, 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT § 1.00, at 1 (Matthew Bender & Co., 2nd ed. 
1992)).  
 21. See GUIDE TO HR POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUALS § 5:4, supra note 4 (“Under these laws, injured 
or ill employees are only required to show that their condition arose out of and in the course of their employment.”); 
see also Harper v. AutoAlliance Int’l, Inc., 392 F.3d 195, 207 n.4 (6th Cir. 2004) (describing the “ordinary 
shorthand” meaning of the workers’ compensation laws as: “a statutorily created insurance system that allows 
employees to receive fixed benefits, without regard to fault, for work-related injuries”). 
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rules of procedure to facilitate prompt compensation, and (5) state 
court review of agency decisions occur[s] on a deferential basis.22   
The workers’ compensation system is highly beneficial because it guarantees 
employees the right to recover for workplace injuries, grants certainty to employers 
about the extent of their liability, and provides efficiency for the process.23 Indeed, 
“one might expect that making the employment relationship less confrontational 
would also help to preserve the employment relationship, thus facilitating the return 
to work of employees who have suffered an injury.”24 However, one area of concern 
is that the remedy is exclusive, and although there is an exception in most states for 
intentional torts, this exception has become seemingly impossible to prove.25 
II. CURRENT STATUTORY SCHEMES 
Many states provide for the intentional tort exception via the state’s workers’ 
compensation statute.26 Yet, the word “intentional” does not carry the same 
connotations in the workers’ compensation context as it does at common law.27 
“Intentional” at common law means not only purposeful acts, but “also situations in 
which the actor knows with substantial certainty that harm will occur.”28 However, 
the interpretation by the majority of states is that intent within the workers’ 
compensation arena only covers an employer’s “purposeful intent to cause the harm 
that actually occurred.”29  
 ________________________  
 22. See Harper, 392 F.3d at 207 n.4 (citing Arthur v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 58 F.3d 121, 125 (4th 
Cir. 1995)). 
 23. See John T. Burnett, The Enigma of Workers’ Compensation Immunity: A Call to the Legislature for a 
Statutorily Defined Intentional Tort Exception, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 491, 517 (2001) (“In Florida, workers’ 
compensation law plays an important social role due to the fact that it ‘assures the quick and efficient delivery of 
disability and medical benefits to an injured worker and facilitate[s] the worker’s return to gainful employment at a 
reasonable cost to the employer.’ For the provision of workers’ compensation benefits to be effective, employers 
and employees alike must renounce some of their common law rights and defenses under the law and look to 
workers’ compensation as the exclusive remedy for qualifying workplace injuries.”) (internal citations omitted).  
 24. Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 1, at 140.  
 25. See Michelle Gorton, Comment, Intentional Disregard: Remedies for the Toxic Workplace, 30 ENVTL. 
L. 811, 811–12 (2000) (arguing that the “workers’ compensation system’s requirement of an employer’s ‘deliberate 
intent’ to injure a worker has been twisted by courts and legislatures so that workers can almost never access the 
civil legal system when they have been hurt at work, even if their employer has acted egregiously. With low risks 
of civil suits or criminal charges and only a small chance of inspection or serious penalty by regulatory agencies, 
the temptation and market pressure is there for employers to choose to save money rather than provide a safe 
workplace.”). But see Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workers’ 
Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 775, 809 (1982) (“threat to the viability of workers’ compensation . . . concerns 
the various judicial efforts to dismantle the exclusive remedy protection that the system affords the employer”); 
King, supra note 7, at 416 (“An effective and predictable exclusive remedy rule that limits employers’ tort liability 
to their employees is a cornerstone of a viable workers’ compensation system.”).  
 26. See 1 JON GELMAN, MODERN WORKERS COMPENSATION § 102:13 (2016) (citing Alaska, California, 
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, 
New Hampshire, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and West 
Virginia as examples).  
 27. Gorton, supra note 25, at 820. 
 28. Id. (citing KEETON ET AL., supra note 8, at 572 n.43). 
 29. Id. (citing Davis v. U.S. Emp’rs Council, Inc., 934 P.2d 1142, 1150 (Or. Ct. App. 1997) (stating that the 
plaintiff “must prove that his employer withheld safety measures because it wished to injure him”)). 
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When an employee is harmed by the intentional conduct of his or her employer, 
an election of remedies must be made.30 If the employee chooses to seek redress for 
the intentional wrong of the employer through the workers’ compensation scheme, 
he or she waives the right to sue in tort.31 Nonetheless, some states still find that the 
exclusive remedy provision does not bar an employee’s claim against the employer 
for defamation32 or false imprisonment.33 However, in most circumstances, courts 
have found that the employee has failed to prove that the cause of action falls within 
the intentional tort exception.34  
A.  Florida  
Adoption of the intentional tort exception to the workers’ compensation scheme 
has arisen both through the legislative process as well as through court opinions.35 
In Florida, for example, the state supreme court initially created the exception for 
employers’ intentional wrongs.36 In Turner v. PCR, Inc., the court stated that 
notwithstanding employers’ general immunity from tort claims under the workers’ 
compensation scheme, Florida case law previously had recognized an intentional tort 
exception.37 Thus, the court held that it was reaffirming this holding, and “as have 
our district courts and many jurisdictions around the country, that workers’ 
compensation law does not protect an employer from liability for an intentional tort 
against an employee.”38  
The court further defined what the intentional tort exception included and 
identified two independent grounds where an intentional tort cause of action may 
exist.39 First, an employee may bring an intentional tort suit when “an employer 
deliberately intended to injure an employee.”40 Second, a cause of action may exist 
 ________________________  
 30. See GELMAN, supra note 26 (noting that “in order to maintain the two separate causes of action, the 
employer’s intentional act must be separable from the compensation claim and produce an independent injury”); see 
also 9 PATRICK JOHN MCGINLEY, 9 WEST’S FLORIDA PRACTICE SERIES § 6A:9 (2015 ed. 2015) (“A worker who 
sues his employer at common law has elected his remedy under Fla. Stat. § 440.11(1)”). Id. (Indeed: “[W]hen 
summary judgment is entered against [the employee] in the common law action, he may not then pursue a workers’ 
compensation claim against the employer who has failed to secure compensation benefits. The election of remedies 
matures, ‘when the rights of the parties have been materially affected to the advantage of one or the disadvantage of 
the other . . . .’ The summary judgment rendered in the circuit court was obviously efficacious. Therefore, the election 
matured when the judgment was entered.”). 
 31. GELMAN, supra note 26. 
 32. See id. (listing cases from Georgia, Indiana, New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, and Virginia 
all holding that the applicable state’s workers’ compensation scheme did not bar claims for defamation).  
 33. See id. (noting that California and Massachusetts courts have held that the workers’ compensation 
exclusive remedy provision does not bar claims for false imprisonment).  
 34. See Webster & Graves, supra note 2.  
 35. See, e.g., Beauchamp v. Dow Chem. Co., 398 N.W.2d 882, 889 (Mich. 1986) (“Because the Legislature 
intended to limit and diffuse liability for accidental injury by no means suggests the Legislature intended to limit 
and diffuse liability for intentional torts. Accidents are an inevitable part of industrial production, intentional torts 
by employers are not.”). 
 36. See Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683, 684–85 (Fla. 2000).  
 37. Id. at 686 (citing Eller v. Shova, 630 So. 2d 537, 539 (Fla. 1993)).  
 38. Id. at 687 (citing Cunningham v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 558 So. 2d 93, 97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); 
Clark v. Gumby’s Pizza Sys., Inc., 674 So. 2d 902, 904 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); see also 2 Arthur Larson & Lex 
K. Larson, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation §§ 68.11–68.15 (Desk. Ed. 1999)). 
 39. Id. at 688–89.  
 40. Id. at 688. 
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when “the employer’s conduct was ‘substantially certain’ to result in injury or death 
to the employee.”41 The court explicitly recognized that other jurisdictions had 
rejected the “substantial certainty” test and replaced it with a “virtual certainty” 
test.42 Yet, the court declined to adopt the more rigid standard.43 
After the court’s holding in Turner, the Florida Legislature enacted an 
amendment to section 440.11(1) of the Florida Statutes, which created the statutory 
intentional-tort exception to workers’ compensation immunity.44 The Florida 
workers’ compensation statute provides, in the portion relevant to coverage, that:  
The employer must pay compensation or furnish benefits required 
by this chapter if the employee suffers an accidental compensable 
injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and the 
scope of employment. The injury, its occupational cause, and any 
resulting manifestations or disability must be established to a 
reasonable degree of medical certainty, based on objective relevant 
medical findings, and the accidental compensable injury must be the 
major contributing cause of any resulting injuries.45 
The Florida Legislature has further provided for the applicable “exclusive remedy” 
of workers’ compensation:  
The liability of an employer prescribed in § 440.10 shall be 
exclusive and in place of all other liability, including vicarious 
liability, of such employer to any third-party tortfeasor and to the 
employee, the legal representative thereof, husband or wife, parents, 
dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover 
damages from such employer at law or in admiralty on account of 
such injury or death . . . .46 
In 2003, the Florida Legislature added the statutory provision that included an 
intentional tort exception that differed significantly from the state supreme court’s 
holding in Turner.47 The intentional tort exception retains the first avenue crafted by 
the state supreme court and allows for employee recovery if the “employer 
deliberately intended to injure the employee.”48 However, the second prong of the 
test, the “substantial certainty” test adopted by the court, was changed significantly, 
and the statute now provides relief only if the employer’s conduct was knowingly 
 ________________________  
 41. Turner, 754 So. 2d at 688–89 (explaining that this is an objective standard: “it is apparent that adoption 
of a subjective analysis would result in the virtual elimination of the alternative test for liability . . . we conclude that 
adoption of an objective standard is more in accord with the policy of the alternative test”).  
 42. Id. at n.4.  
 43. Id.  
 44. See FLA. STAT. § 440.11(1)(b)(1) (2015).   
 45. Id. § 440.09(1).  
 46. Id. § 440.11(1). 
 47. Id. § 440.11(1)(b)(1)–(2).  
 48. Id. § 440.11(1)(b)(1). 
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“virtually certain to result in injury or death”; the employee was not aware of the 
risk; and the employer either “deliberately concealed or misrepresented the 
danger.”49 If the employee claims an intentional tort exception, the employee must 
prove these elements by clear and convincing evidence.50   
Thus, the Florida Legislature “fundamentally changed the nature of that 
immunity from the court-created immunity” in several significant ways.51 Not only 
did the legislature heighten the evidentiary burden to clear and convincing evidence, 
the statutory standard is also subjective rather than objective, and the legislature 
rejected the “substantial certainty” test and replaced it with the “virtual certainty” 
test.52 Thus, employees waive any negligence—and most intentional tort—claims 
they may have against their employer the moment they begin employment.  
B.  Harsh Results  
An example of the harsh application of the current Florida statutory scheme is 
R.L. Haines Construction, LLC v. Santamaria.53 An employee was killed while 
working on a construction site when a two-thousand pound steel column struck 
him.54 The employee worked on installation of these columns, which he could not 
install until an epoxy adhesive cured for seventy-two hours.55 Despite the curing 
instructions, R.L Haines instructed the decedent and other employees to install 
columns after the adhesive had only been drying for forty-four hours.56 The 
employees installed four columns, and while the decedent was tightening a wire on 
one of the columns, it fell and killed him.57 
The decedent’s spouse filed a wrongful death action against the general 
contractor, R.L. Haines, and other defendants.58 R.L. Haines asserted an immunity 
defense per the workers’ compensation statute, but the trial court held that the 
company’s conduct fell within the intentional tort exception.59 The majority of a 
Fifth District Court of Appeal panel reversed, holding that the contractor’s conduct 
did not meet the “virtual certainty” standard.60 The court noted that “‘the test is not 
whether the injury was preventable,’”61 but instead it is whether “it was virtually 
certain that the decedent would be injured or killed as a result of the resumption of 
 ________________________  
 49. Id. § 440.11(1)(b)(2). 
 50. FLA. STAT. § 440.11(1)(b). 
 51. See Webster & Graves, supra note 2.  
 52. Id.  
 53. R.L. Haines Constr., LLC v. Santamaria, 161 So. 3d 528, 532 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) review denied, 
171 So. 3d 120 (Fla. 2015) (noting that the “virtually certain” standard is “extremely difficult to overcome”); see 
also Webster & Graves, supra note 2 (“As several courts have noted, the effect of the amendment has been to create 
a significantly higher hurdle that employees seeking to overcome workers’ compensation immunity must 
surmount.”). 
 54. R.L. Haines Constr., 161 So. 3d at 529. 
 55. Id. at 529–30.  
 56. Id. at 530.  
 57. Id.  
 58. Id. at 529. 
 59. Id. The jury awarded the decedent’s spouse a total of 2.4 million dollars. Id. at 530.  
 60. R.L. Haines Constr., 161 So. 3d at 534. 
 61. Id. at 533 (citing Vallejos v. Lan Cargo, S.A., 116 So. 3d 545, 554 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)). 
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work before the epoxy had fully cured.”62 The court also stated that “[i]t would erode 
the statutory standard for overcoming workers’ compensation immunity to indulge 
an inference of virtual certainty from the fact that the employee was injured or 
killed.”63 Thus, the panel reversed the jury verdict in favor of the decedent’s spouse, 
holding that “absent clear and convincing evidence that the decedent’s death was 
virtually certain to occur as a result of [R.L. Haines’s] conduct, the verdicts [could 
not] stand.”64 
One judge dissented from the R.L. Haines opinion, noting that while the statutory 
requirement of “virtual certainty” sets the burden high, it “does not mean that it is, 
or should be, illusory or unattainable.”65 The dissent relied on additional facts that 
were absent from the majority opinion, including that the project manager knew a 
bolt had moved, which would not have happened if the epoxy was properly mixed 
and allowed to cure for the appropriate amount of time.66 Moreover, the project 
manager did not inform the project engineer, and knowledge that a bolt had moved 
would have been a “red flag” of installation failure.67 Further, a project manager 
testified that under these conditions, the likelihood of employee injury was “more 
than certain.”68 Accordingly, the dissent found that “sufficient evidence supported 
the conclusion that the employer received ‘explicit warnings specifically identifying 
a known danger.’”69 Therefore, the dissent would have held that the decision to 
submit the issue of “virtual certainty” to the jury was within the province of the trial 
judge, and the jury’s finding that the contractor’s conduct was virtually certain to 
result in injury or death should have been upheld.70  
R.L. Haines demonstrates that Florida courts applying the 2003 amendment 
believe that the intentional tort exception is an extremely high standard.71 No opinion 
written subsequent to the statutory amendment concludes that an employee is entitled 
to recover under the “virtual certainty” test, and most frequently, the appellate court 
is affirming summary judgment in favor of the employer.72 
III. CLASSIFYING THE REMEDY  
To understand the structure of the workers’ compensation scheme, one way to 
discern how legislatures and courts alike have fashioned these workers’ 
compensation statutes as exclusive remedies lies in the transaction costs associated 
 ________________________  
 62. Id.  
 63. Id. at 533–34.  
 64. Id. at 534. 
 65. Id. (Cohen, J., dissenting).  
 66. R.L. Haines Constr., 161 So. 3d at 535 (Cohen, J., dissenting).  
 67. Id.  
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 440.11(1)(b)(2) (2010)).  
 70. Id. at 535–36 (“In my view, sufficient evidence supported the conclusion that the employer received 
‘explicit warnings specifically identifying a known danger.’”).  
 71. Webster & Graves, supra note 2.  
 72. Id. (referencing List Indus., Inc. v. Dalien, 107 So. 3d 470, 471, 474 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013), review 
denied, 122 So. 3d 867 (Fla. 2013); Gorham v. Zachry Indus., Inc., 105 So. 3d 629, 634 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013); 
Boston v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 112 So. 3d 654, 657–58, 660 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013); Vallejos v. Lan Cargo, 
S.A., 116 So. 3d 545, 554–56 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013); R.L. Haines Constr., 161 So. 3d at 530, 533–34).  
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with work-related injuries. First, there are the costs related to the rights of the 
employees to be compensated for such injuries and related expenses.73 Second, there 
are the costs associated with the rights of the employer to have predictable and 
efficient outcomes when an employee is injured in its workplace.74 The balance of 
these transaction costs can be illustrated through the theoretical model provided by 
Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed.75 An additional way to view the 
boundaries of the remedies under workers’ compensation law is a model provided 
by Daryl Levinson, and assessing how the rights and remedies are interrelated.76  
A.  Property v. Liability Rule Protections 
Under Calabresi and Melamed’s approach, there are two leading types of 
protections for entitlements or individual rights: property rules and liability rules.77 
Property rules apply to individual entitlements that cannot be taken away from the 
owner without the owner’s consent.78  This rule “gives rise to the least amount of 
state intervention: once the original entitlement is decided upon, the state does not 
try to decide its value.”79 The property rules apply when transaction costs are low 
because with low transaction costs, negotiation is available.80 Liability rules, on the 
other hand, generally govern when transaction costs are high.81 When transaction 
 ________________________  
 73. See, e.g., Estreicher, supra note 15, at 1134.  
 74. Sidney A. Shapiro, The Necessity of OSHA, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 22, 23, 28 (1999) (“An employer 
determines the extent of its efforts to prevent occupational injuries and illnesses by comparing the cost of prevention 
with the cost of not reducing these risks.”).  
 75. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One 
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); see also Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution 
and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 500–01, 517 (1961).  
 76. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 857 
(1999). 
 77. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 75, at 1092.  
 78. Id.; see also Michael I. Krauss, Property Rules vs. Liability Rules, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & 
ECONOMICS 782, 786–87 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000), 
http://encyclo.findlaw.com/3800book.pdf (explaining that “[e]ntitlement holders who believe their rights are 
protected by a property rule typically insist that they are the victims, not the cause, of damage: otherwise, their rights 
would be trumped by utility- or wealth-maximizing constraints, which is contrary to the very notion of property-rule 
protection”).  
 79. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 75, at 1092.  
 80. See id.; see also Keith N. Hylton, A Missing Markets Theory of Tort Law, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 977, 980 
(1996) (“Transaction costs include the cost of defining the entitlement, determining its value, and bargaining over 
its transfer. These costs are likely to be low in areas where the scope of the holder’s claim is easily delineated, such 
as the boundary to a piece of land. The power to enjoin a taking forces the nonholder to meet the asking price in 
order to transfer the good from the holder. In the absence of such protection the nonholder would be able to 
expropriate part of the value of the holder’s entitlement.”).  
 81. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 75, at 1119; see also id. at 1093 (discussing liability versus property 
protections, and reasoning that it is relevant to look at if there is an inclination “slightly to prefer one over another 
and the first is considerably more expensive to enforce than the second”). Moreover, Calabresi & Melamed discuss 
the fact that administrative efficiency is relevant to choosing whether an entitlement is subject to property or liability 
rules based on all of the pertinent considerations. See id.; see also Krauss, supra note 78, at 786 (“To the extent 
entitlements are protected by liability rules, rights (and therefore causation) are inherently contingent; the cause of 
an injury is the efficient avoider of the injury. The cheaper-cost avoider of a loss will always be said to have caused 
the loss if entitlements are protected by liability rules.”).  
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costs are high for both parties, a liability rule provides the more appropriate remedy 
as negotiation will not lead to a Pareto optimal outcome.82  
One factor pertinent in the transaction-cost analysis is the need to “minimize the 
administrative costs of enforcement.”83 Yet, administrative efficiency is simply one 
factor to consider in the overall economic analysis to determine the efficiency of 
transactions.84 Calabresi subsequently explained the practicality of the liability rule 
approach:  
If ideologically mixed, liability rules are also intensely practical. 
They enable actions to take place when contractual behavior, before 
harm, would not be feasible. Damages after harm replace such 
unfeasible agreements. And they permit control of behavior that 
could only at too great an expense be governed collectively. By 
varying the size of the applicable damages according to the various 
circumstances involved, the collective decision makers can go a 
long way toward enforcing their views without engaging in minutiae 
of control that would not be worthwhile.85 
Thus, “the liability rule is an essential part of the social structure and of the law. And 
that is so in any number of areas of law, including, of course, torts.”86 
To illustrate applicability of the doctrine to the workers’ compensation context,87 
assume that an employee has an entitlement to a cause of action in tort for negligence 
against an employer. Under the applicable state’s workers’ compensation provision, 
an employee waives this cause of action via statute by beginning employment and 
has an exclusive remedy for any harm suffered from the negligence of his 
employer—workers’ compensation. Therefore, because an employee’s cause of 
action dissipates before the employee ever incurs the right—indeed, at the moment 
the employment contract is signed—the employee’s entitlement has converted into 
an entitlement protected by a liability rule (i.e., to receive the amount of monetary 
damages provided for in the state’s workers’ compensation scheme, regardless of the 
employee’s wish to sue in tort).  
Market inhibition and the efficiency of transactions in the employment context 
dictate this outcome, based on the history and the framework of the employer-
employee relationship. The reason this is important is that the analysis determines 
that an employee does not have a property right in maintaining causes of action 
 ________________________  
 82. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 75, at 1119. Calabresi & Melamed discuss Pareto optimality in terms 
of economic efficiency: “Economic efficiency asks that we choose the set of entitlements which would lead to that 
allocation of resources which could not be improved in the sense that a further change would not so improve the 
condition of those who gained by it that they could compensate those who lost from it and still be better off than 
before.” See id. at 1093–94.  
 83. Id. at 1093. 
 84. Id.  
 85. Calabresi, supra note 3, at 529.  
 86. Guido Calabresi, A Broader View of the Cathedral: The Significance of the Liability Rule, Correcting a 
Misapprehension, 7 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 12 (2014). 
 87. It is noted that Calabresi also discusses workers’ compensation from an economic perspective of the 
“allocation of resources” and “loss-distribution” theories. For this discussion, see Calabresi, supra note 75, at 500, 
517. 
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against their employers, except within the statutory exceptions, because societal 
transaction costs have determined that a liability rule applies. 
Therefore, the statutorily mandated workers’ compensation damages provide the 
appropriate remedy for common work-related injuries under liability rule 
protections. Arguably, this analysis also explains why state legislatures choose to 
carve out an intentional tort exception to the workers’ compensation statutes. By 
doing so, states have determined that an employee may maintain his right to his 
bodily integrity in refusing to consent to willful or intentional injury. However, due 
to the transaction costs implicated in the employment context, to meet the intentional 
tort exception, legislatures demand that the employee meet a higher evidentiary 
standard to demonstrate that he or she meets the strict test.88   
Thus, the intentional tort exception provides heightened liability rule protections 
to a portion of work-related injuries for public policy reasons, and once this 
protection is implicated, it becomes an election of remedies issue.89 This means that 
the employee must choose to either accept the statutory workers’ compensation as 
his exclusive remedy, or waive such coverage and choose to sue in tort.90 
Accordingly, an employee’s “complaint that he would have demanded more will not 
avail him once the objectively determined value is set.”91 And ideally, the workers’ 
compensation system based on this model “internalize[s] expected costs to all 
potential injurers and potential victims in a way that would minimize the cost of 
accidents.”92 
B.  Rights Essentialism, Remedial Equilibration, and Remedial 
Deterrence  
Calabresi and Melamed’s model, distinguishing property and liability type 
protections for certain rights, implicates an additional concept called the rights 
essentialism theory.93 The rights essentialism theory initially identifies the right and 
then identifies the appropriate judicial application of the right.94 Viewed separately 
from the remedy, the right “is then corrupted by being forced into a remedial 
apparatus that translates the right into an operational rule applied to the facts of the 
real world.”95 However, under an approach discussed by Daryl Levinson, rights 
essentialism is not the most accurate model, and Levinson provides a new theory 
 ________________________  
 88. See, e.g., R.L. Haines Constr., LLC v. Santamaria, 161 So. 3d 528, 534 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) review 
denied, 171 So. 3d 120 (Fla. 2015). 
 89. MCGINLEY, supra note 30. 
 90. Id.  
 91. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 75, at 1092.  
 92. Steven G. Medema, Debating Law’s Irrelevance: Legal Scholarship and the Coase Theorem in the 
1960s, 2 TEX. A&M L. REV. 159, 178 (2014).  
 93. Levinson, supra note 76, at 858 (discussing that like constitutional law, contract law also implicates the 
idea that rights and remedies are “functionally inseparable,” interdependent, and “inextricably intertwined,” as 
recognized by Calabresi and Melamed).  
 94. Id. It is noted that Levinson’s approach to defining the scope of remedies takes the form of a constitutional 
law analysis; however, Levinson’s article also usefully compares and contrasts constitutional law with the private 
law of contract and tort, with comparisons to Calabresi and Melamed’s theory of property and liability rules, useful 
for comparison in the workers’ compensation context. Id.  
 95. Id.  
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with a more applicable approach to remedies law called “remedial equilibration.”96 
Under the remedial equilibration model: “[r]ights are dependent on remedies not just 
for their application to the real world, but for their scope, shape, and very 
existence.”97 Indeed, as applied to Calabresi and Melamed’s approach,  
a ‘right’ . . . enforced by a liability rule means something different 
than one enforced by a property rule, and that deciding who has a 
right (or, in Cathedral terms, an “entitlement”) is often less 
important than deciding how that right should be protected in order 
to best facilitate efficient transfers.98 
In the workers’ compensation context, application of the remedial equilibration 
model demonstrates that the right interrelates with the remedy, that is, the right to 
workers’ compensation relief under a negligence theory necessarily ties the liability 
rule protection for the right into a remedial equilibration model. Rights essentialists 
would view the right as separate from the remedy: that the employee has a job, and 
if the employer intentionally injures him, then the employee would have a remedy 
of suing his employer in tort. However, remedial equilibration demonstrates that it 
is meaningless to talk about a distinction between rights and remedies: an employee 
has a right to sue in tort if his employer intentionally injures him. Nonetheless, the 
employee’s right to sue his employer in tort for intentional wrongdoings is 
meaningless if the remedy is inaccessible.99 Certainly, if a right never results in a 
remedy, the right is irrelevant.  
Accordingly, an additional theory applicable to analyze the narrowness of the 
intentional tort exception is remedial deterrence.100 This doctrine assumes that 
raising the “price” of violating a right by giving greater remedial protection would 
result in fewer violations of the right.101 Therefore, Levinson posits that the way for 
courts to lessen the number of rights’ violations is to diminish the right in the first 
place.102 A corollary is that courts can also lower the “price” of the violations by 
limiting the remedies available.103 And, although the application of remedial 
deterrence may be difficult to apply based on fact-specific factors,104 the “general 
 ________________________  
 96. See id. Levinson explains that: “The rights-essentialist picture, in which courts begin with the pure, 
Platonic ideal of a constitutional right and only then pragmatically apply the right through the vehicles of 
implementation and remediation, bears little resemblance to the actual judicial practice of rights-construction.” Id. 
at 873.  
 97. Levinson, supra note 76, at 858. 
 98. Id. at 859.  
 99. As a logical extension of the dissent in R.L. Haines, the exception for intentionality should not be 
impossible to overcome—that is why there is an existence of an intentional-tort exception to the workers’ 
compensation scheme. See R.L. Haines Constr., LLC v. Santamaria, 161 So. 3d 528, 534 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) 
(Cohen, J., dissenting). 
 100. For a detailed discussion on remedial deterrence in the constitutional context, see Levinson, supra note 
76, at 889–900. 
 101. Id. at 889. 
 102. Id.  
 103. Id.  
 104. See id. at 890 (“Individual examples of remedial deterrence are difficult to document with great 
confidence because claiming that a right would be different if a different remedy followed entails a counterfactual 
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point [is] that remedial consequences exert an important influence over the shape 
and existence” of rights.105 Therefore, courts will construe rights in a way to avoid 
undesirable remedial consequences.106   
As applied to the right to recovery under the intentional wrongdoing exception 
to most state workers’ compensation schemes, the remedial deterrence model 
provides one avenue of explanation for why courts construe the applicable statutes 
narrowly. It provides a model that demonstrates that courts are likely to define the 
right restrictively, given the unpredictability of the outcomes for allowing such 
claims to proceed. This not only helps persuade the employee to choose to elect 
workers’ compensation as his or her remedy,107 but also limits the right in a way that 
promotes the policy behind implementing workers’ compensation regimes in the first 
place.108 Thus, this model effectively describes why and how courts have limited and 
narrowly construed an employee’s right to sue under the intentional tort exception 
to workers’ compensation systems.  
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS  
Once it is determined what type of remedial protection applies, one can begin to 
analyze how courts analyze issues that arise in the workers’ compensation arena. Of 
previous constitutional concern was the Due Process Clause, but the Supreme Court 
of the United States has resolved this issue in favor of the constitutionality of 
workers’ compensation schemes.109 The argument was that workers’ compensation 
statutes were unconstitutional because these regimes abrogate both an individual’s 
right to file a lawsuit in tort and the right to a jury trial.110 In 1917, the Supreme Court 
upheld New York’s Workman’s Compensation Law, finding that the legislature 
could alter such common law rights in compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment 
if the legislature provides a “reasonably just substitute.”111 The Court clarified that 
“[t]his, of course, is not to say that any scale of compensation, however insignificant, 
on the one hand, or onerous, on the other, would be supportable.”112  
 ________________________  
claim that is ordinarily highly speculative: that the right would have been A rather than B if the remedy had been X 
rather than Y.”).  
 105. Id.  
 106. Levinson, supra note 76, at 885.  
 107. Once an employee elects his remedy by suing the employer in tort for an intentional wrongdoing, the 
employee has waived his right to collect under the workers’ compensation scheme. See MCGINLEY, supra note 30 
(citing Chiang v. Wildcat Groves, Inc., 703 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)). 
 108. See Burnett, supra note 23, at 491 (discussing the policy reasons for implementing workers’ 
compensation statutes in the United States).  
 109. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 208 (1917). 
 110. See Deborah G. Kohl, Tackling the Elephant in the Room: Exclusive Remedy, LEXISNEXIS LEGAL 
NEWSROOM: WORKERS COMPENSATION L. (Mar. 11, 2015, 10:41 PM), 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/workers-compensation/b/recent-cases-news-trends-developments/ 
archive/2015/03/11/tackling-the-elephant-in-the-room-exclusive-remedy.aspx#sthash.LlX4CJVN.dpuf.  
 111. White, 243 U.S. at 201.  
 112. Id. at 205.  
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A.  General Policy Concerns and the Intentional Tort Exception 
Today, two main concerns arise within the workers’ compensation field—the 
amount of compensation given to the injured employee under the exclusive remedial 
provision113 and the scope of the intentional tort exception.114 The under-
compensation concern begs the question: “[W]hen do statutory changes result in 
such a manifest violation of the social bargain that the only answer is to void the 
exclusive remedy doctrine and reinstate the tort remedy?”115 The full answer to this 
question is beyond the scope of this paper; however, it should be noted that over the 
previous thirteen years, thirty-three state legislatures “have cut benefits, made it 
more difficult to qualify for benefits or given employers more control over medical 
treatment.”116 Yet, the employer’s intentional wrong raises the most concern because 
“[u]nlike ordinary negligence, intentional harms introduce an element of moral 
hazard that is very difficult to control by a set of rules designed for accidents.”117   
Recently in Florida, the constitutionality of the exclusivity of the remedy under 
the workers’ compensation statute has been attacked, albeit unsuccessfully.118 This 
provision has also been challenged in various other states.119 However, as the 
exclusive remedy is ostensibly the most appropriate approach to ensure efficient 
compensation for injured employees while promoting an effective market by 
providing clarity for the employer, it is likely that with its long history and its current 
application, this remedy will remain exclusive for employees injured by an 
 ________________________  
 113. See Kohl, supra note 110. “When is the replacement for the tort system a reasonable alternative?” Id. 
“[A]t what dollar level do you draw the line below which a system is providing an unconstitutional level of benefits 
and reversion to tort law is the only remedy?” Id. “At what level has the legislature gone so far as to impinge on the 
social bargain and tread on due process?” Id.; see also Shapiro, supra note 74, at 28 (“In most states, there is an 
inverse relationship between the seriousness of an injury and the amount of compensation. The compensation for 
fatalities is often less than the amount paid for temporary and permanent disabilities. Statutorily prescribed formulas 
limit compensation for temporary disabilities to less than the direct wage losses of better paid employees. Worse, 
compensation for permanent partial disability payments often does not equal the total wage loss of any employee. 
Finally, there is no compensation for the loss of fringe benefits or nonpecuniary losses to workers and their 
families.”).  
 114. See Gorton, supra note 25, at 811.  
 115. Id.  
 116. Howard Berkes, Opt-Out Plans Let Companies Work Without Workers’ Comp, NPR (Oct. 15, 2015, 7:07 
AM), http://www.npr.org/2015/10/14/448544926/texas-oklahoma-permit-companies-to-dump-worker-
compensation-plans.  
 117. Epstein, supra note 25, at 814. Epstein argues that employer’s intentional torts possibly should not be 
directed into the tort system as if the workers’ compensation laws did not exist. Id. He rejects this approach as 
inferior, arguing for an alternative of additional fines assessed to the employer through existing workers’ 
compensation statutes for intentional wrongs to employees. See id. (“The advantages of this approach are two. First, 
it keeps the entire case within the workers’ compensation system, so that there is no need to worry about the 
coordination of tort and compensation actions. Second, it protects the system against the indirect erosion that occurs 
when the intent requirement is attenuated to include mental states that are insufficient to support either criminal 
punishment or . . . punitive damages.”).  
 118. See Florida v. Fla. Workers’ Advocates, 167 So. 3d 500, 501 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015). Due to procedural 
issues, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s holding that section 440.11 of the Florida Statutes (i.e., the 
“exclusiveness of liability” provision) was facially unconstitutional under both the United States and Florida 
Constitutions. Id. The appellate court therefore never reached the merits of the claim. See id. at 506. 
 119. See, e.g., McKinnon v. W. Sugar Coop. Corp., 225 P.3d 1221, 1222 (Mont. 2010); Mo. Alliance for 
Retired Ams. v. Dep’t of Labor Indus. Relations, 277 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Mo. 2009).  
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employer’s negligence. But, the exception to this exclusivity—the right to sue for an 
intentional tort—is more controversial.  
As discussed above in Section II, the Florida statutory scheme outlining this 
exception and the subsequent Florida case law demonstrate the harsh results in the 
application of the intentional wrongdoing exception.120 Indeed, workers’ 
compensation schemes that provide an exception for intentional wrongs by 
employers who act with “deliberate intent” or “virtual certainty” that their conduct 
will result in injury or death have “been twisted by courts and legislatures so that 
workers can almost never access the civil legal system when they have been hurt at 
work, even if their employer has acted egregiously.”121 Employers are able to 
capitalize on this and choose to save money rather than provide a safe workplace 
because of the low risks of an employee having a successful civil claim.122 Because 
the current approach to the intentional wrongdoing exception to workers’ 
compensation schemes essentially eviscerates any remedy for the employee, these 
systems should be revisited.  
B.  Employer Opt-Out Programs 
Another concerning mechanism crafted by two individual states to date are 
employee opt-out programs. In Texas, for example, employers are not required to 
participate in the state’s workers’ compensation program; they are free to “opt out” 
of it.123 Texas refers to those employers that choose to opt out of workers’ 
compensation as “non-subscribers.”124 The Texas Department of Insurance explains 
that such nonsubscribers are not immune from lawsuits by employees and thus could 
be subject to high damage awards if sued by an employee for negligence.125 On the 
contrary, if an employer participates in the workers’ compensation program, Texas 
law limits the employer’s liability and sets a statutory cap on damages, dictating that 
such compensation is the exclusive remedy for the employee.126 
However, despite the ostensible risk Texas employers seem to be taking by 
opting out of the workers’ compensation scheme, it actually proves to be more cost 
effective for these employers. These plans “almost universally have lower benefits, 
more restrictions and virtually no independent oversight.”127 Under these schemes, 
 ________________________  
 120. See supra Part II.A–B for a discussion of the Florida workers’ compensation statute and subsequent case: 
R.L. Haines Constr., LLC v. Santamaria, 161 So. 3d 528 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) review denied, 171 So. 3d 120 
(Fla. 2015).  
 121. Gorton, supra note 25, at 811. 
 122. Id.  
 123. See Workers’ Compensation Insurance, TEX. DEP’T INS., http://www.tdi.texas.gov/consumer/wc.html 
(last visited Mar. 2, 2016).  
 124. See Information for Workers’ Compensation Non-subscribers, TEX. DEP’T INS., 
http://www.tdi.texas.gov/wc/ employer/cb007.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2016).  
 125. Id.  
 126. Id.  
 127. Michael Grabell & Howard Berkes, Inside Corporate America’s Campaign to Ditch Workers’ Comp, 
PROPUBLICA (Oct. 14, 2015), https://www.propublica.org/article/inside-corporate-americas-plan-to-ditch-workers-
comp (explaining that these opt-out programs are “why McDonald’s doesn’t cover carpal tunnel syndrome and why 
Brookdale Senior Living, the nation’s largest chadin of assisted living facilities, doesn’t cover most bacterial 
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employers are not required to submit any documentation to the state about the 
coverage provided because Texas does not regulate opt-out programs.128 Indeed, 
employers have been fighting bills for several years that would require them to share 
this data.129  
Oklahoma similarly enacted an opt-out-of-workers’-compensation statute last 
year.130 Tennessee and South Carolina are also considering implementing such 
plans.131 Moreover, several leading company executives are campaigning to have 
laws passed “in as many as a dozen states” within the next ten years.132 These plans 
“give employers almost complete control over the medical and legal process after 
workers get injured,” including choosing doctors, settling claims, and forcing the 
employees to accept the settlement at the employer’s whim.133 To be sure, the 
employees can appeal the employer’s decision, but most often, the employee has 
agreed to a binding decision by a committee set up by the employer.134 Even without 
such committees, most often the employee has consented to the employer’s program 
as his sole remedy when he began employment.135  
C.  Recommendation 
Both the exclusive remedy provision, with its exception for intentional 
wrongdoings, and the opt-out systems in place in Texas and Oklahoma implicate a 
further issue within the remedial context, the concept of remedial substantiation. This 
theory holds that “the cash value of a right is often nothing more than what the courts 
will do if the right is violated”—the remedies that are available determine the 
right.136 Therefore, if a person has no remedy, discussion of the violation of a right 
is meaningless because the perceived right is no right at all without a remedy.137 
Thus, both issues “bring into question the basic fundamental social bargain that made 
workers’ compensation systems possible in the first place.”138  
Accordingly, at least this author posits that because a right means nothing 
without a remedy—indeed under the principles of remedial equilibration and 
particularly within the theory of remedial substantiation—that reform is necessary 
in the area of workers’ compensation. Specifically, the intentional tort exception 
needs to be revised so the remedy is not illusory. Reform could be accomplished, in 
Florida for example, by revisiting the Florida Legislature’s 2003 amendment to the 
workers’ compensation statute and reinstating the broader test fashioned by the state 
 ________________________  
infections. Why Taco Bell can accompany injured workers to doctors’ appointments and Sears can deny benefits if 
workers don’t report injuries by the end of their shifts”).  
 128. Id.  
 129. Id.  
 130. Berkes, supra note 116.  
 131. Grabell & Berkes, supra note 127.    
 132. Id. 
 133. Id.   
 134. Id.  
 135. Id.  
 136. Levinson, supra note 76, at 887–88.  
 137. See id. at 888. 
 138. See Kohl, supra note 110. 
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supreme court. The test for whether an employee may maintain a cause of action 
against an employer for intentional misconduct should comport with common law 
principles of intent. Therefore, the test should be whether the employer’s conduct 
was substantially certain to result in injury or death for the employee. Tests that align 
more closely with common law principles have been successfully implemented in 
several states,139 and there is also a wide body of common law for courts to follow 
to implement this standard.  
The “substantial certainty” test is the more appropriate standard, as demonstrated 
by the states’ compensation systems that currently provide that this is the appropriate 
test.140 Indeed, “[d]espite critics’ warnings about the floodgates opening up and the 
workers’ compensation system losing all meaning, the expansion has been very 
limited.”141 In only a few instances, “containing the most egregious employer 
actions,” have employees been able to recover under this “expanded” standard.142 
Moreover, cases decided in Florida subsequent to the state supreme court’s holding, 
but prior to the legislature’s 2003 amendment, demonstrate that the “substantial 
certainty” standard is more workable.143  
Applying a “substantial certainty” test will facilitate a system that does not strip 
employees of their right to sue for an intentional wrongdoing by removing the 
remedy, as the current system does. Employees should have access to the legal 
system when an employer acts egregiously, and the scope of the remedy should not 
be limited to the subjective standard of an employer’s knowledge that its conduct is 
“virtually certain” to result in injury or death. Moreover, the statutory opt-out 
schemes often dwindle any liability-type protections into nothing, and therefore 
these systems should be revisited to ensure that employees are not left without a 
remedy for workplace-related injuries.  
CONCLUSION 
The exclusive remedy doctrine is a “fundamental building block of the workers’ 
compensation system.”144 Indeed, an effective and predictable exclusive remedy 
 ________________________  
 139. Gorton, supra note 25, at 841 (citing Ohio, Michigan, West Virginia, Louisiana, and North Carolina as 
examples).  
 140. Id.  
 141. Id. (citing Melissa F. Ross, Comment, Ripples in Treacherous Waters: A Consideration of the Effects of 
North Carolina’s Intentional Tort Exception to Workers’ Compensation, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 513 (1996) 
(documenting North Carolina’s experience)). 
 142. Id. (citing Ross, supra note 141, at 554).  
 143. Under this standard, Florida courts focused on the specific facts of each case and found that sometimes 
recovery was appropriate, while in other circumstances recovery was not available for the employee under the 
intentional tort exception, but applying the substantial certainty test. See, e.g., EAC USA, Inc. v. Kawa, 805 So. 2d 
1, 5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (finding that the employer’s actions were substantially certain to result in injury to 
the employee, applying the Turner objective substantial certainty test). But see Garrick v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 
798 So. 2d 875, 879 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (applying the objective standard set forth in Turner, the Fourth District 
Court of Appeals held that the complaint did not contain allegations of ultimate facts that would support a jury’s 
verdict that the employer’s conduct was substantially certain to result in injury to the employee); Pacheco v. Power 
& Light Co., 784 So. 2d 1159, 1163 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (denying recovery and noting that “that the cases 
which have actually applied the Turner doctrine, especially Turner itself, have characteristically involved a degree 
of deliberate or willful indifference to employee safety which simply [did] not exist in [that] case”). 
 144. Kohl, supra note 110. 
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doctrine that limits employer liability for employee injuries is necessary for a viable 
workers’ compensation system.145 This remains true even though an employee loses 
his or her right to sue in tort or to have a jury trial.146 However, if an employee’s 
right to sue in tort for intentional wrongdoings by the employer never results in 
recovery, the liability rule protections afforded to such employee are rendered 
meaningless.  
A different system is not the answer; workers’ compensation statutes as an 
exclusive remedy for common workplace injuries facilitate outcomes that are more 
efficient for employees and provide a level of certainty to employers.147 Indeed, 
turning to an alternative system “is not one which any of the participants . . . from 
employee to employer to insurer to legislature should lightly enter into without 
forethought and consideration of all of the potential consequences.”148 Yet, the 
exclusive remedy provision should not encompass intentional wrongdoings by an 
employer that the employer knows or is “substantially certain” will result in injury 
or death to its employee. Because a right without a remedy is not a right at all,149 as 
Florida case law demonstrates, the exception to the system for intentional 
wrongdoings should be revisited.  
 
 ________________________  
 145. King, supra note 7, at 416. 
 146. See N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 195–96 (1917). 
 147. See King, supra note 7, at 416. 
 148. Kohl, supra note 110. 
 149. Indeed, under the principles of remedial substantiation, if the cash value of a right is zero, the right really 
does not exist at all. See Levinson, supra note 76. Moreover, under the principles of remedial deterrence, if the 
legislature provides the more appropriate exception to the exclusive remedy doctrine of “substantial certainty” rather 
than “virtual certainty,” courts will be less likely to construe an employee’s right so narrowly that it does not allow 
for recovery, and rather it will result in the remedy being accessible for intentional wrongdoings by the employer.  
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